Privitization of Old-Age Pensions in Latin America:  Lessons for Social Security Reform in the United States by Paskin, Michael Alan
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 62 Issue 7 Article 12 
1994 
Privitization of Old-Age Pensions in Latin America: Lessons for 
Social Security Reform in the United States 
Michael Alan Paskin 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Michael Alan Paskin, Privitization of Old-Age Pensions in Latin America: Lessons for Social Security 
Reform in the United States, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 2199 (1994). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol62/iss7/12 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
PRIVATIZATION OF OLD-AGE PENSIONS IN LATIN
AMERICA: LESSONS FOR SOCIAL SECURITY
REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES
MICHAEL ALAN PASKIN
INTRODUCTION
The United States Social Security' system has been criticized both for
its inability to generate national savings to promote investment and its
long-term inability to pay for itself when the current working generation
of baby-boomers retires. In Latin America, a region that frequently fol-
lows rather than establishes North American economic trends, several
governments have initiated a variety of reforms to privatize their social
security systems. By learning from its neighbors to the south, the United
States can restructure its own pension system to succeed in the next
century.
Part I of this Note discusses the historical development of the Social
Security system in the United States.2 This Part explores various con-
temporary criticisms, focusing on the inability of the present "pay-as-
you-go" system to generate national savings and investment, and the
long-term infeasibility of the continued existence of the Social Security
system in the United States.
Part II examines how several Latin American governments reformed
their social security systems by wholly or partially replacing state-run
retirement insurance schemes with privately-managed pension funds.3
This Part focuses on three case studies of Latin American social security:
Chile, which was the first Latin American country to privatize its social
security system in 1981,' and Argentina5 and Mexico, 6 two countries
that have adopted the Chilean model, partially replacing or supplement-
ing their state-run social security systems with private pension schemes.
Part III demonstrates that the privatization of old-age pensions, like
that instituted in Latin America, is a feasible option for social security
reform in the United States.7 Through Parliament's passage of legisla-
tion in 1975 and 1986, the United Kingdom adopted a private alternative
1. Throughout this Note, the term "social security" refers exclusively to old-age
pensions paid by the government to retirees, and does not include other elements of a
comprehensive national social insurance program such as health care and disability. The
terms "social security" and "pension" are used interchangeably. Furthermore, when
capitalized, Social Security refers exclusively to the social security system in the United
States, as created by the Social Security Act of 1935 and subsequent amendments. See 42
U.S.C. § 301 (1988).
2. See infra part I.A-B.
3. See infra part II.
4. See infra part II.A. 1.
5. See infra part II.A.2.
6. See infra part II.A.3.
7. See infra part III.A-B.
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to social security,8 demonstrating that privatization can be implemented
successfully in an industrialized nation. While the United States is far
more industrialized and economically developed than its Latin American
neighbors, it shares similar goals in implementing options for social se-
curity reform. Today, the United States seeks to solve similar problems
to those that Latin American countries sought to remedy by privatizing
their social security systems. Primarily, these problems are the need to
stimulate saving and investment on a national basis and to guarantee the
survival of old-age insurance in the United States through the next cen-
tury. Furthermore, allowing workers to invest their retirement contribu-
tions with private, competitive pension funds will make financial markets
more accessible to all segments of the population, resulting in a positive
impact on the inequitable distribution of wealth in the United States.
I. SOCIAL SECURITY IN THE UNITED STATES
The current system of Social Security in the United States is becoming
a fiscal burden to the government and it fails to generate adequate levels
of national savings and investment.
A. Development and Current Structure of Social Security in the
United States
The first form of a national public pension scheme in the United States
was military pensions.9 Initially, tariff revenues were the primary source
to fund these pensions."0 Early in the nineteenth century, the collection
of these tariffs began, in limited form, to pay disability pensions for Revo-
lutionary War veterans. The tariffs continued to be the major source of
funding for military pensions following the Civil War. Congress enacted
several pieces of legislation during the latter half of the nineteenth cen-
tury to provide financial security for disabled Civil War veterans." In
1912, Congress passed legislation specifying that simply being age sixty-
two counted as a disability, resulting in the significant expansion in the
number of pensions.' 2 The Civil War pensions grew to the point where
thirty percent of all men over age sixty-five in the United States received
some benefit.13
While the Civil War pension legislation covered a substantial number
8. See Social Security Pensions Act, 1975, ch. 60 (Eng.); Social Security Act, 1986,
ch. 50 (Eng.).
9. See John B. Williamson & Fred C. Pampel, Old-Age Security in Comparative
Perspective 87 (1993).
10. See id.
11. See id. at 88-89. At first these Civil War pensions only covered service-related
disabilities, under the 1862 Civil War Pension Act and the 1879 Arrears Act, but gradu-
ally expanded to include all veterans of the Civil War. See id. The 1890 Dependency
Pension Act granted pensions to any veteran of the Union army who had served at least
ninety days. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id. at 89.
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of elderly Americans, the majority of the working population still re-
ceived no government-sponsored pension benefits. Especially as the vet-
eran population declined during the early twentieth century, some
reformers began to call for a national system of old-age pensions. 4 The
development of national old-age pension systems in many European na-
tions largely influenced these proposals. 5 Throughout the first two de-
cades of the twentieth century, many socialist-influenced reformers
unsuccessfully introduced bills in Congress for the establishment of a na-
tional pension scheme.' 6 Both at the federal and state level, however,
there was little support for the idea of a government-run pension sys-
tem. 7 One reason why national pension legislation failed during this pe-
riod is that the forces of organized labor opposed a national pension
scheme as a threat to the power and autonomy of the unions.'
8
Although there were some union or corporate-sponsored pensions for re-
tired employees, no national legislation existed.I9
As the American economy degenerated during the Great Depression,
many of the corporate and union pension plans suffered from insufficient
funding.2 ° As early as 1925, the leaders of large corporations questioned
the viability of corporate pension schemes, and began to support federal
legislation. With most union pension plans facing bankruptcy in the
early 1930s, the American Federation of Labor shifted its support in
favor of public pensions. 21 Some states enacted old-age pension legisla-
tion, and by 1931 eighteen states had passed legislation creating pension
schemes for retirees.22 The Supreme Court, however, declared the first
national pension legislation, the 1934 Railroad Retirement Act,'
unconstitutional.24
The instability of private sources of savings for retirement during the
Depression brought increased popular and political support for a system
of federal old-age pensions.25 President Franklin D. Roosevelt used this
14. See id at 89-92.
15. Germany was the first nation in the world to enact national compulsory old-age
pensions, which it did in 1889. See id. at 22. The United Kingdom first legislated a
national pension system under the Old Age Pension Act of 1908. See id. at 51.
16. See id. at 89-90.
17. Arizona was the only State to legislate an old-age pension system, in 1914. See id.
at 90. This, however, was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of Arizona in
1915. See id
18. See id.
19. See id at 90-92.
20. See id. at 92.
21. See id at 91-92.
22. See id.
23. See Railroad Retirement Act, ch. 868, 48 Stat. 1283 (1934) (repealed).
24. See Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330, 362 (1935) (hold-
ing that the Act violated both the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause).
25. See Carolyn L. Weaver, The Economics and Politics of the Emergence of Social
Security: Some Implications for Reform, in Social Security: Prospects for Real Reform
117, 128 (Peter J. Ferrara ed., 1985).
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swelling support to push forward the Social Security Act of 1935,26
which established a compulsory, contributory, earnings-related national
pension system.27
Initially, the Social Security Act of 1935 did not require the distribu-
tion of benefits until 1942.28 This policy would have allowed the growth
of a large trust fund of reserves, such that each worker essentially could
fund his own retirement. By the late 1930s, however, large business in-
terests opposed the build-up of reserves because it kept money out of the
economy. Based on these concerns, Congress passed in 1939 the first
amendments to the Social Security Act of 1935, calling for increased ben-
efits, and advancing to 1940 the date on which the first pensions would be
distributed.29 Over the years, the benefits and extension of coverage
under Social Security gradually have been liberalized.3" In 1982, ninety-
two percent of all Americans over age sixty-five received some Social
Security benefit.31 The net effect of the liberalization of Social Security
benefits throughout the 1970s was to make the system almost universal in
terms of coverage, but to deplete the Social Security trust fund in the
process. Recent legislation has attempted to rebuild the trust fund by
cutting benefits and raising taxes in order to pay for the pensions payable
to today's workers when they retire.32
B. Problems and Criticisms of the Current Social Security System in
the United States
The primary criticisms of Social Security in the United States focus on
the long-term problems inherent in a pay-as-you-go system. Two major
negative effects of the current pay-as-you-go system are: (1) with an ag-
ing population, a funding crisis in social security is inevitable when the
generation of current workers retires; and (2) the funds contributed to
Social Security through payroll taxes do not contribute sufficiently to na-
26. Social Security Act, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 301-1397 (1988)).
27. See id. §§ 201-10. The Act did not only provide old-age pensions, but constituted
a comprehensive system of social insurance including welfare, disability, and medical
coverage. See id. §§ 1-1105. When President Roosevelt addressed Congress in 1934 re-
garding the need for Social Security, he emphasized the comprehensive nature of his
intended proposal, which would "provide at once security against several of the dis-
turbing factors in life-especially those which relate to unemployment and old-age." 78
Cong. Rec. 10,771 (1934).
28. See § 202(a), 49 Stat. at 623.
29. See Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, 53 Stat. 1360, 1361.
30. Amendments passed in 1950 changed the benefit formula so that benefit eligibility
was further moved forward. See Act of Aug. 28, 1950, ch. 809, 64 Stat. 477. During the
Nixon administration, the process of liberalization of benefits advanced rapidly, with leg-
islation calling for increased pension size, the indexing of benefits to account for inflation,
and the creation of the Supplemental Security Insurance program. See Social Security
Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329.
31. See Williamson & Pampel, supra note 9, at 103.
32. See Social Security Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-216, 91 Stat. 1509; So-
cial Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65.
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tional savings, and could be more wisely spent if invested to promote
economic growth, rather than simply redistributing income from the
younger generation of workers to the older generation of retirees.
1. Lack of Funds to Pay Future Pensions
As a result of the aging of the American population, the ratio of work-
ing Americans to retirees is falling steadily. This ratio will fall more rap-
idly as the baby boom generation retires in approximately fifteen years. 33
Since the 1983 amendments, annual Social Security surpluses gradu-
ally have shifted Social Security away from a true pay-as-you-go system,
and the trust fund has grown steadily.34 The problem with these sur-
pluses, however, is that they have been used to offset the federal govern-
ment budget deficit in other areas,3 which results in a regressive tax
rather than a trust fund, and fails to ease the Social Security burden on
future generations.36 These developments have prompted some analysts
to criticize the policy of building the trust fund to pay for the baby
boomers' retirement.37
Without a valid trust fund, enormous tax increases will eventually be
required to fund future Social Security benefits.38 It has been suggested
that without fundamental reform of the current system, the rising tax
burden of Social Security on working Americans will lead to a political
war between the young and the old.39
2. Insufficient Savings and Investment
The second major drawback of the United States pay-as-you-go Social
Security system is that it takes money away from savings. The promise
of retirement pensions under Social Security acts as a disincentive to pri-
vate saving in the United States, because Americans are not individually
responsible for financing their retirements. When Social Security re-
places private savings, money is not used productively for investment in
33. See Henry J. Aaron et at, Can America Afford to Grow Old: Paying for Social
Security 2-3 (1989). The proportion of the working-age population to senior citizens was
five to one in 1985. By the year 2050, Aaron projects that this ratio will fall to about two
and one-half to one. See id (Table 1-1).
34. See iL at 1.
35. See id at 6-7.
36. See John Wood, Social Security: Invaluable or Outmoded?, Modem Maturity,
Apr.-May 1992, at 34 (Panel Discussion).
37. See, eg., James L. Kilpatrick, Neither Social Nor Secure, Nation's Bus., Jan. 1985,
at 6. ("The present system of social 'insurance' supposedly relies upon a 'trust fund,' but
the system is not insurance, and the trust fund is a joke.").
38. See Peter J. Ferrara, Social Security: Prospects for Real Reform 2 (1985). The
1985 OASDI Report estimated that to pay for the Social Security benefits promised to a
worker entering the workforce in 1985, the Social Security payroll tax would need to be
raised from 14.1 percent to 37.5 percent. See Haeworth Robertson, The National Com-
mission's Failure to Achieve Reform, in Social Security: Prospects for Real Reform 37, 58
(Peter J. Ferrara ed., 1985).
39. See Kilpatrick, supra note 37, at 6.
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capital formation, which then causes a detrimental effect on the national
income level.' Furthermore, because the rate of return on investment
available through Social Security is well below those rates of return avail-
able on the open market, individuals have less money for their retire-
ments than they would if their Social Security tax withholdings were
invested privately in the capital markets.4 1
II. SOCIAL SECURITY IN LATIN AMERICA
Latin America has a rich history of social security. Most Latin Ameri-
can governments established national old-age pensions in the 1920s;42
this development, however, was stratified largely because of weak central
governments and strong pressure groups, especially labor unions and
political parties.43 This stratification in the social security systems of
Latin American countries led to widespread inequality of coverage and
benefits levels in Latin American society. Latin American countries de-
veloped a general need to reform social security in such a way as to make
the system more equitable and to expand coverage to the entire
population.'
During the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s, many govern-
ments of the region faced additional problems with their social security
systems. As these governments became bankrupt, it became imperative
for them to reduce budgetary costs and to promote economic develop-
ment through investment.45
Many Latin American governments turned to privatization as a means
to address these crises. Industrial privatization has been a region-wide
trend throughout the past decade. Governments have sold state enter-
prises in order to raise short term money to finance their accumulated
debt.46 The sale of these inefficiently managed industries to private own-
ers, and the resultant competition in the marketplace has promoted gen-
eral economic growth throughout the region. 7
Privatization of social security generally is concurrent with, and seen
as a complementary policy to, general industrial privatization programs
in Latin America.48 Privatizing of pension schemes has reduced the fis-
40. See Michael J. Boskin, Too Many Promises: The Uncertain Future of Social Se-
curity 10 (1986).
41. See Peter J. Ferrara & John R. Lott, Jr., Rates of Return Promised by Social
Security to Today's Young Workers, in Social Security: Prospects for Real Reform 13, 19-
23 (Peter J. Ferrara ed., 1985).
42. See Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Social Security in Latin America: Pressure Groups,
Stratification, and Inequality 5 (1978).
43. See id. at 10-14.
44. See id. at 14-16.
45. See William R. Long, When the Safety Net Unravels, L.A. Times, Aug. 14, 1991,
at Al.
46. See Katherine Conradt, A Brazilian Beat: Privatization Aficianados are Energized
by Prospects in Brazil, Latin Fin., July-Aug. 1993, at 22, 22.
47. See id.
48. See id. at 24.
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cal burden on Latin governments, and simultaneously has stimulated na-
tional savings and investment in capital formation in Latin America.
A. Case Studies of Latin American Social Security Privatization
The cases of Chile, Argentina, and Mexico provide three examples of
the successful privatization process in Latin America. These nations
clearly illustrate the problem of stratification and the inability to generate
national savings and capital growth through a state run, pay-as-you-go
social security system. Each country responded to these problems by
privatizing social security to some degree, although each tailored its indi-
vidual solution to match its particular political and economic climate.
1. Chile
In 1980, Chile privatized its social security system to relieve the gov-
ernment's administrative burden, eliminate the stratification and inequal-
ity that pervaded the pension system, and promote economic growth
through saving and investment in private capital markets.4 9 Because of
its success, Chile's privatization program has become the Latin Ameri-
can model for social security reform.
a. Developments Before Privatization
Chile pioneered social security in the Western Hemisphere."0 Despite
social security's early appearance in Chile, a long period of intermittent
development spurred by various political pressure groups, resulted in a
system that was marked by inequality, stratification, and high costs to
the government by the 1970s.11
In the nineteenth century and the early stages of the twentieth, only a
few limited Chilean groups with significant political influence could se-
cure legislation providing for old-age pensions. These groups included
the military, civil servants, and railroad workers.5 2 The great mass of
both blue-collar and white-collar workers, however, were not unionized
sufficiently to exert the political pressure required to secure social secur-
ity legislation. 3 The Mexican Revolution of 1917 spurred the labor
movement in Chile and the adoption of a new Constitution.' The
newly-found political force of labor supported the election of Arturo
Alessandri Palma as President of Chile in 1920.1 In 1924, the final year
of his presidency, Alessandri overcame opposition in the Chilean Senate
to pass legislation that would serve as the basis for Chile's social security
49. See Decree Law 3,500 (Chile 1980).
50. See Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Ascent to Bankruptcy: Financing Social Security in
Latin America 105 (1989).
51. See Mesa-Lago, supra note 42, at 69.
52. See id. at 23-24.





system-pensions for blue and white-collar workers. 56
During the following four decades, Chilean social security gradually
expanded until one plan or another covered the majority of the working
population. This expansion, however, was achieved one pressure group
at a time, and separate legislation protected each individual group of
workers. Consequently, each industry had different pension benefits and
its own governmental agency regulating and administering its pensions. 57
Carmelo Mesa-Lago has defined this phenomenon as the "massification
of privilege.""8
This patch-work expansion of social security in Chile continued into
the 1950s, when President Jorge Alessandri Rodriguez recognized the
need to reform the system. Shortly after his election in 1958, Alessandri
established a commission to examine Chile's social security system and to
recommend reform measures.59 The commission found the system to be
"one of the most discriminatory in the world," and a regressive tax that
was "made possible through the organization of the most powerful and
wealthy groups into privileged funds separated from the common or gen-
eral funds."'  Despite the fact that Alessandri's commission had identi-
fied the need to unify benefits and the administration of social security
and to extend protection to the self-employed and small employers, the
powerful pressure groups permitted the passage of only minimal reform
laws prior to 1973.61
In the early 1970s, there were thirty-one separate old-age pensions in
the "system," each with its own legislation, administration, and financ-
ing.62 There was no single coordinating public authority. The system
placed a huge financial burden on the Chilean government-in 1971, its
operating costs represented seventeen percent of Chile's gross domestic
product.63 At this stage, President Eduardo Frei foresaw a grim future
for the Chile's social security system, commenting that it was a "perma-
nent source of instability and unrest [and] a paralyzing obstacle to the
plans of economic development and social reform, . . . [leading] inevita-
bly to the bankruptcy of the social security funds or to the bankruptcy of
the country."'
56. See id. at 25.
57. See id. at 26-28. Examples of individual industries whose workers received pen-
sion coverage during this period are petroleum (1933), racetracks (1936), and banks
(1946). See id.
58. See Mesa-Lago, supra note 50, at 105.
59. See Mesa-Lago, supra note 42, at 28.
60. Id. (quoting Comisi6n de Estudios de la Seguridad Social, Informe Sobre la
Reforma de la Seguridad Social Chilena (1964-1965)).
61. See id. at 29. This period included the presidencies of both Eduardo Frei (1964-
70) and Salvador Allende (1970-73). See id.
62. See Mesa-Lago, supra note 50, at 108-09.
63. See id. at 105.
64. Mesa-Lago, supra note 42, at 29 (quoting Repfiblica de Chile, Mensaje del Pre-
sidente al Senado y la Cdmara de Diputados, Santiago, May, 1966).
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b. Reform Through Privatization
Chile's future dramatically changed in 1973, when General Augosto
Pinochet overthrew the government and took control in a military coup.
The military dictatorship that followed proved to be the only form of
government that successfully could overcome the pressure groups, bring-
ing about true reform of the social security system and eventually, in
1980, privatization of the system.
Upon seizing control, Pinochet used his military power to overthrow
the pressure groups, unions, and political parties, and he introduced
many of the social security reforms that Alessandri's commission had
proposed a decade earlier.65 These reforms, implemented between 1974
and 1979, were aimed at eliminating costly privileges, establishing a uni-
form minimum benefit, fixing equal retirement ages across the system,
and creating administrative interrelationships among the many separate
pensions.66
In 1980, recognizing the economic crisis facing Chile, Pinochet radi-
cally changed his policies by relaxing his tight control of the economy
and enacting free market reform. 67 As part of this policy, Pinochet
privatized the great majority of previously government-owned industry.6
The privatization of Chile's social security system was integral to both
the industrial privatization program and economic recovery in general.
On November 4, 1980, Pinochet created a system of retirement pensions
based on individual capitalization of retirement accounts invested with
private pension fund managers, who were called Administradoras de
Fondos de Pensiones, or AFPs.69 The system essentially functions as a
"compulsory private savings program."'7 Beginning in 1983, all new
workers entering the workforce are required to contribute at least ten
percent of their wages to an approved AFP of their choosing.7 Self-
employed workers are not required to join an AFP, but have the option
of doing so.7" Workers who leave the state system to join an AFP receive
an advance on accumulated retirement contributions, so that prior con-
65. See Mesa-Lago, supra note 50, at 109.
66. See id.
67. See Rita Koselka, A Better Way to Do It, Forbes, Oct. 28, 1991, at 158, 158.
68. See Jean A. Briggs, A Political Miracle, Forbes, May 11, 1992, at 108, 109-110.
69. See Decree Law 3,500, tit. I, art. 1 (Chile 1980). The private social security sys-
tem created by Decree Law 3,500 went into effect on May 1, 1981. See Decree Law
3,500, tit. X, art. 97 (Chile 1980).
70. Mesa-Lago, supra note 50, at 110.
71. See Decree Law 3,500, tit. III, art. 21 (Chile 1980). Contributions by employers
are not required.
72. See Decree Law 3,500, tit. IX, art. 89 (Chile 1980). When the new social security
system was established in 1981, workers were given until May, 1986 to change to the
private system, and, prior to 1983, new workers could elect to enter the state-run system.
See Robert J. Myers, Privatizacidn en Chile del Sistema de Seguridad Social, in Analisis
de la Previsi6n en Chile 13, 18 (Sergio Baeza ed., 1986).
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tributions are not lost by switching to the AFP.73
Currently there are sixteen operating AFPs, which function much like
mutual funds in the United States.74 The various AFPs compete for in-
vestors based primarily on fees and service.7" There is little differentia-
tion, however, among the rates of return of the various funds, due to
strict government regulation of investments.76 Despite heavy restraints
on investment strategies, the AFPs consistently have outperformed the
state-run social security system, averaging an annual real rate of return
of thirteen percent during their first decade of operation. 7
The AFPs effectively have transferred the burden of administering so-
cial security in Chile to the private sector, while the state assumes a sub-
sidiary role. By 1986, between eighty-five and ninety percent of all
employees in Chile had changed their pensions to the privatized sys-
tem,78 and the old system is expected to disappear gradually over the
next forty to fifty years.7 9 The government's primary remaining respon-
sibilities are to regulate the AFPs and to guarantee a basic minimum old-
age pension for all retirees.80
c. Evaluation of the Privatization
The privatization of social security in Chile undoubtedly has solved
many of the problems that were inherent in the state-run system it sup-
planted. Perhaps the greatest accomplishment of the privatization of
pensions, however, has been its positive effect on economic development
in Chile, by stimulating national savings and investment.
For individual workers, Chile's privatized social security system repre-
sents a significant improvement over the old, state-run system. The dis-
tinguishing characteristics of the new system are individual saving and
capitalization and freedom of choice. Because each worker maintains his
or her own account, the level of each retiree's pension is related directly
to the amount of the worker's contributions to the AFP throughout his
73. These advances are formally known as "Bonos de Reconocimiento." See Decree
Law 3,500, tit. XI, art. 3-4 (Chile 1980).
74. The system is heavily influenced by American economics. The Minister of Labor
under Pinochet who introduced the reform, Jose Pifiera, is a Harvard-trained economist.
See Briggs, supra note 68, at 109. Also, the largest of the sixteen AFPs, AFP Provida, is
forty-two percent owned by the American firm Bankers Trust. See id.
75. See Saul Hansell, The New Wave in Old-Age Pensions, Institutional Investor, Nov.
1992, at 77, 81.
76. See id. The legislation created the "Superintendencia de Administradoras de
Fondos de Pensiones" to register the AFPs and to regulate their operation. See Decree
Law 3,500, tit. X, art. 93-97 (Chile 1980). There are limitations on the amount of money
that may be invested in the Santiago Stock Market, as well as limitations on the amount
of an AFP's assets that may be invested in any single company. In addition to this,
investment performance is monitored closely, and substantial penalties are levied on
funds that earn returns significantly below the norm. See Hansell, supra note 75, at 81.
77. See Koselka supra note 67, at 160.
78. See Myers, supra note 72, at 18.
79. See Mesa-Lago, supra note 50, at I 11.
80. See Decree Law 3,500, tit. VII, art. 73-75 (Chile 1980).
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or her working life."1 In addition, employees voluntarily may choose to
deposit in excess of the mandatory ten percent contribution to their AFP
account, to develop a greater retirement pension. Workers also benefit
from the freedom of choice within the system. Because workers may
choose among the various AFPs and may switch from one fund to an-
other every six months, the AFPs must offer competitive fees and en-
deavor to invest profitably. 2
Most important, however, is the role played by Chile's privatized pen-
sion system in the country's economic resurgence during the past decade.
The AFPs currently manage roughly $12.5 billion worth of funds, a sig-
nificant sum for a country of only thirteen million people.83 While the
state-run system only invested social security withholdings in govern-
ment bonds, the AFPs have diversified their holdings to include private
stocks and bonds.8" These huge reserves of capital have stimulated pri-
vate investment in Chile, and the economy has grown in response. For
example, the Santiago Stock Market has boomed in recent years, largely
because of money invested by the AFPs. 5 Of course, as the economy
continues to expand, the AFPs will accumulate more wealth, which in
turn may be invested, prompting further private economic growth. This
upward spiral translates to a high rate of economic growth in Chile, aver-
aging five percent per year. 6 Finally, the privatization of the social se-
curity system in Chile has been essential to industrial privatization,
because the expanded pool of private savings created by the AFPs has
enabled the government to sell off many of its subsidized holdings to
private investors.87
Thus, overall, the privatization of social security in Chile has been suc-
cessful on several fronts.88 For the individual, privatization eliminated
the inequality and waste associated with the old state-run system and
helped workers obtain more lucrative and secure pensions. Moreover,
the AFPs have stimulated private saving and investment in Chile, and,
therefore, overall economic development. Although a democratic gov-
ernment gained control of Chile in 1990,9 these sweeping reforms would
81. See Hernfin Cheyre Valenzuela, La Previsi6n en Chile Ayer y Hoy: Impacto de
una Reforma 184-85 (1988).
82. See id. at 187-88. Upon retirement, workers also have a choice as to the form of
their pension: they may either contract with an insurance company to buy an annuity
with the proceeds of their account to receive set periodic payments, or they may continue
to maintain their AFP account and exercise more control over the disbursement of their
pension. See Decree Law 3,500, tit. VI, art. 62-69 (Chile 1980).
83. See Hansell, supra note 75, at 78, 81.
84. See Koselka, supra note 67, at 160. The AFPs may invest up to fifty percent of
their funds in private corporate debt and up to thirty percent in private corporate equi-
ties. See id.
85. See id
86. See Briggs, supra note 68, at 110.
87. See Ed Rubenstein, The Other Path, Nat'l Rev., Apr. 30, 1990, at 16, 16.
88. For a contrary view, see Jose Pablo Arellano, Una Mirada Crdica a la Reforma
Previsional de 1981, in Baeza, supra note 72, at 81, 81-92.
89. See Briggs, supra note 68, at 108.
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not have been possible without the political backdrop of Pinochet's mili-
tary dictatorship, by which he promulgated the reforms by decree.90 The
cases of Argentina and Mexico demonstrate that in countries with demo-
cratic political processes, such far-reaching reforms must be achieved
gradually and with compromises.
2. Argentina
As in Chile, social security in Argentina developed slowly over a pe-
riod of many decades. Due to the power of political pressure groups in
Argentina, the social security system developed in a stratified manner,
marked by unequal benefits, administrative inefficiency, and high cost to
the government. In recent years, President Carlos Saul Menem and Eco-
nomic Minister Domingo Felipe Cavallo of Argentina initiated a wide-
spread privatization program intended to reduce the fiscal burden on the
government and to promote economic development.9 Menem and
Cavallo based their plan for social security reform on the model estab-
lished by Chile.
In September, 1993, the Argentine Senate passed a bill partially priva-
tizing social security.92 The reform is less radical than that adopted in
Chile in 1980, as workers have an option either to maintain their pension
in the state-run system, or to transfer their retirement funds to a pri-
vately-managed account. 93 The case of Argentina demonstrates how, in
a democratic political system as opposed to Pinochet's military junta in
Chile, the legislative process works more slowly, and widespread reforms
come about more gradually.
a. Developments Before Privatization
During the first century of Argentina's statehood, from its indepen-
dence in 1810 to the turn of the twentieth century, the landed oligarchy
dominated the government. 94 Throughout this period, government em-
ployees received extensive social security protection, while the majority
of the workforce was unprotected. 95
Around the turn of the twentieth century, the organization of the Ar-
gentine labor movement forced the government to recognize the needs of
90. But see Angelo Codevilla, Is Pinochet the Model?, Foreign Aft., Nov.-Dec. 1993,
at 127 (arguing that the Chilean model should not be followed because Pinochet's free-
market reforms came at the expense of human rights and democracy).
91. See Ministerio de Economia y Obras y Servicios P6blicos, Argentina: A Growing
Nation 22 (1993) [hereinafter A Growing Nation].
92. See Argentine Senate Passes Social Security Reform, Reuters, Sept. 23, 1993, avail-
able in Westlaw, INT-NEWS database.
93. See id.
94. See Mesa-Lago, supra note 42, at 160-61.
95. Top civil servants received pensions in 1810, and national old-age security was
granted to judges in 1877, and to public school teachers in 1885. See id. at 161.
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the masses of non-government workers.96 The Conservatives who con-
trolled Argentina during this period, however, continually repressed the
unions, which resulted in an increasing number of violent strikes in Ar-
gentina prior to 1915.11 The growing power of labor eventually forced
the Conservatives to appease the strongest union factions by passing
some reform legislation, including, in 1915, a social security package for
the railroad workers.98 When Conservative rule ended in 1916, the new
leader of the Radical Republic, Yrigoyen, slowly passed individual pieces
of social security legislation to grant pensions to the most influential mid-
dle class pressure groups, which provided his base of political support.9
One group at a time, pension coverage slowly expanded, but the govern-
ment still gave little attention to the majority of workers.
Colonel Juan Domingo Per6n was elected President of Argentina in
1946 and maintained control of the country for a decade. He owed much
of his political power to the leaders of the labor movement, and, during
his presidency, Per6n laid the foundations for modern social security in
Argentina.1"° While pension coverage expanded to include the majority
of the workforce, 101 stratification of the social security system in Argen-
tina increased under Per6n. 102
In the 1960s and 1970s, social security reforms in Argentina focused
on trying to remedy the problems of inequality and stratification that
pervaded the system during the Per6n years. Unification of the system
began in 1967, when General Juan Carlos Ongania, the leader of the mili-
tary government, enacted legislation to consolidate several of the pension
funds, which reduced administrative costs and facilitated regulation.10 3
Returning to power in 1973, Per6n attempted to continue the unification
process, but his attempts proved unsuccessful because the return to de-
mocracy also revived the power of the pressure groups) °4
As social security developed in Argentina, the system provided ade-
quate coverage for the population, but at a high cost to the govern-
ment.10 5 These costs became increasingly burdensome through the
96. See id. Railroad and printing workers were the first to organize, in 1887, and the
first national workers' federation formed in 1901. See id
97. See id. at 162. There was a general strike in Argentina in 1909, and a national
railroad strike in 1912. See iL
98. See idt
99. See id at 162-63.
100. See idt at 164-65.
101. Among the new groups to receive pensions were industrial workers, the self-em-
ployed, and professionals. See id
102. During Per6n's regime, a dozen new and distinct social security pension funds
came into existence. See idt at 164, 170-71.
103. See id at 166-67.
104. See id at 167-68.
105. See Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Social Security in Latin America and the Caribbean: A
Comparative Assessment, in Social Security in Developing Countries 356, 364-370 (Eh-
tisham Abmad et aL eds., 1991). In 1985, 74.3 percent of the Argentine population was
covered by social security, a high figure compared to other Latin American countries, see
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1980s, as the Latin American debt crisis ravaged the Argentine econ-
omy. 106 In the meantime, social security expenditure as a percentage of
Gross Domestic Product remained relatively constant during the same
period, and even increased from 1990 to 1992.107 In 1989, the Argentine
economy hit rock bottom and exploded into hyperinflation. 1 8
b. Reform Through Privatization
Beginning at the bottom, in 1989, President Carlos Menem initiated a
sweeping economic recovery program. Menem's primary goals were to
reform the structure of the state, 10 9 reduce the government debt through
refinancing, 11o boost the economy with free market reform,"' liberalize
trade, 112 and increase production.' 13 Widespread privatization has been
an "essential ingredient in the process of state reform.""' Thus far, the
privatization program has been successful in reducing the deficit, encour-
aging investment to increase productivity, limiting costs of services, and
strengthening Argentina's capital markets." 15
Based on the model established by Chile, President Menem and Minis-
ter Cavallo also considered the privatization of social security to be an
integral element of Argentina's overall development, because such a re-
form would promote growth through saving and investment. 1 6 The
state-run social security system worked against these aims, because it
forced the government to use proceeds generated from industrial priva-
tizations to pay for Argentina's indebted pension system.'17
Argentina's democratic political framework prevented Menem from
id. at 370, but the system operated at a deficit, with social security expenditures repre-
senting thirty-eight percent of the national budget in 1980. See id. at 364.
106. See A Growing Nation, supra note 91, at 19-22. Public debt in Argentina rose
throughout the 1980s to peak in 1989. Internal public debt reached seventeen billion U.S.
dollars in the first quarter of 1989. See id. at 19. External public debt also peaked in
1989, reaching 59.7 percent of Gross Domestic Product. See id. at 22.
107. See id. at 6-7.
108. Consumer prices in Argentina rose 4,923.6% in 1989. See id. at 3.
109. See id. at 4.
110. See id. at 19.
111. See id. at 25.
112. See id. at 32.
113. See id. at 35.
114. Id. at 16.
115. See id. at 16-17.
116. See id. at 27-29.
117. See Argentine Government Owes Pensioners $12 Billion, Reuters, July 8, 1993,
available in Westlaw, INT-NEWS database. On July 7, 1993, Cavallo announced that
the government was indebted to pensioners in the amount of twelve billion dollars, and
that almost sixty percent of the proceeds generated by the privatization of the national
petroleum company, Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales, as well as proceeds from other
Argentine privatizations, would be spent to satisfy this debt. See id. The state-run pen-
sion system was created under the presumption that there were four workers for each
retiree, but in Argentina presently each retiree is supported by only 1.5 members of the
workforce. See Argentine Lower House Approves Pension Reform Bill, Reuters, Apr. 30,
1993, available in Westlaw, INT-NEWS database.
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reforming social security in Argentina as drastically and as rapidly as
Pinochet had done in Chile. Menem's initial proposal called for a
mandatory private pension scheme, much like that Pinochet introduced
in Chile."' However, the power of the labor unions-one of the legacies
of the former President Per6n-delayed congressional passage of the bill
for more than a year, until amendments were added that made private
pensions optional rather than mandatory.119 The final version of the bill,
passed by the Argentine Senate on September 23, 1993, also was further
revised to include amendments discouraging banks and insurance com-
panies from managing private pension funds, and establishing Argen-
tina's central bank, Banco de la Naci6n, as a pension administrator and
guarantor of a minimum return. 20 Bankers and economists criticized
the amendments, stating that the presence of the central bank would im-
pede competition and the state-guaranteed minimum posed a long-term
threat to fiscal stability.12"' Nonetheless, representatives of the Argentine
government praised the new legislation as "a fundamental change in our
social security system."' 22 Cavallo "want[ed] the pension funds to be up
and running as soon as possible."' 23 President Menem also stated that
the privatization of pensions, coupled with other recent reforms, are
"strengthen[ing] the state's capacity to devote itself to its fundamental
tasks-health care and education, justice and security ....
c. Evaluation of Privatization
While it is too early to know the effects of the new legislation on the
Argentine economy, the private pension funds probably will have a posi-
tive effect on saving and investment. Because participation in the system
is optional rather than mandatory, it is doubtful that the net effect of the
118. See Argentine Gov't Accepts Pension Bill Amendments, Reuters, Apr. 28, 1993,
available in Westlaw, INT-NEWS database.
119. See iL; Argentine Lower House Approves Pension Reform Bill, Reuters, Apr. 30,
1993, available in Westlaw, INT-NEWS database. Argentina's largest labor union, CGT,
had previously delayed the legislation during the drafting stage until the bill was
amended to allow unions to participate as fund managers in the private system. See
Banco Velox, Anuario-92: Business Trends 33 (1992).
120. See Argentine Senate Passes Social Security Reform, Reuters, Sept. 23, 1993, avail-
able in Westlaw, INT-NEWS database; Argentine Pensions Bill to Undergo More Amend-
ments, Reuters, May 13, 1993, available in Westlaw, INT-NEWVS database.
121. See Argentines Say Pension Bill Is Better Than No Bill, Reuters, Sept. 24, 1993,
available in Westlaw, INT-NEWS database.
122. See Argentine Senate Passes Key Social Security Reform, Reuters, Sept. 23, 1993,
available in Westlaw, INT-NEWS database (quoting senate speaker Eduardo Menem,
brother of President Saul Menem).
123. See Menem To Review Argentine Pension Reform Law, Reuters, Oct. 12, 1993,
available in Westlaw, INT-NEWS database. The government is, however, now trying to
submit complimentary legislation that would reduce the role of the central bank. See
Argentina to Amend New Private Pensions Law, Reuters, Oct. 13, 1993, available in
Westlaw, INT-NEVS database.
124. Nathan Gardels & Abraham Lowenthal, Disappearing the State in Argentina,
New Persp. Q., Fall 1993, at 8 (interview with President Carlos Saul Menem).
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privatization will be as great in Argentina as in Chile.125 The case of
Argentina demonstrates the difficulty of effectuating social security re-
form in a democracy. 126 Even in an environment in which the transfer of
economic power and responsibility from the state to private companies is
encouraged, it can be especially difficult to bring about sweeping reform
in social security because people are suspicious of any change that might
threaten their pension benefits. 127 This provides insight into the potential
difficulties of privatizing old-age pensions in the United States.
3. Mexico
Social security developed later in Mexico than in Chile and Argentina.
By the 1980s, the Mexican system was more unified than those in Chile
and Argentina, but the pension coverage it provided was seriously inade-
quate. In February, 1992, the Mexican government enacted legislation
that reformed the existing system to provide better pensions for work-
ers.'22 The new law also instituted a supplemental pension sub-account
that placed funds in the hands of Mexico's newly-privatized commercial
banks, intending to promote long-term savings and develop Mexico's
capital markets. 129 The case of Mexico illustrates the interaction be-
tween private pensions and capital markets, and shows that a relatively
small transfer of social security money to private fund managers can sig-
nificantly affect the level of private saving and investment.
a. Developments Before Privatization
The first century of Mexican independence following its revolution
from Spain in 1821 was marked by the absence of a strong central gov-
ernment and the concentration of power in the hands of relatively few
wealthy land owners. 130 At first, the conservative elite maintained a local
power structure, which served only to increase social stratification and
perpetuate anarchy.131 The ensuing liberal regime centralized the gov-
ernment, but chose to maintain a laissez-faire economic policy, which
served to concentrate further economic power in the hands of the
wealthy. 132 The effect of this trend on social security was that until the
1920s, only selected civil servants in Mexico received old-age pensions
125. Early estimates predict that seventy percent of Argentina's workers will switch to
the private funds when the new system goes into effect in July, 1994, which would signifi-
cantly boost national savings. See Argentina Sees Massive Switch to New Pensions Plan,
Reuters, Dec. 14, 1993, available in Westlaw, INT-NEWS database.
126. See Hansell, supra note 75, at 82.
127. See id.
128. See Catherine Mansell Carstens, The Retirement Savings System: Mexico's Revo-
lutionary Pension Fund Reform, Bus. Mex., Apr. 1992.
129. See id.
130. See Mesa-Lago, supra note 42, at 208-12.





In 1917, the Mexican government adopted a new Constitution, which
recognized the interests of labor for the first time." The Constitution's
provisions regarding social security, however, were vague, and no real
advances in pensions came for several years. Between 1925 and 1942, the
government slowly passed legislation, establishing pension funds for dif-
ferent employee groups. Still, the groups covered by these laws came
only from the most powerful pressure groups and unions, including civil
servants who received pensions in 1925, the military (1926), teachers
(1928), and workers in the petroleum (1935), railroad (1938), and elec-
tricity (1941) industries.3 5 General Lfzaro Cfrdenas, who served as
Mexico's president from 1934 to 1940, made several unsuccessful at-
tempts to enact a federal social security law for the masses of workers. 136
In 1943, Cdrdenas's successor, General Manuel Avila Camacho, fi-
nally succeeded in introducing a national system of social security. 37
This legislation granted pensions to the mass of urban blue and white-
collar workers, and created the Mexican Institute of Social Insurance, or
IMSS, to administer the system, a role the IMSS still plays today.1 31
The Mexican social security system slowly grew under the control of
the IMSS from the 1950s to the early 1970s, but the percentage of the
population that received pensions remained low.'3 9 In 1973, new legisla-
tion stressed the importance of expanding pension coverage, in order to
avoid "'deepen[ing] the differences among the inhabitants of the coun-
try,' perpetuating a 'dual society with a few privileged members and a
majority [without protection].' ,,4 The legislation also warned, how-
ever, that rapid expansion could endanger the financial stability of the
IMSS. By 1980, social security covered fifty-three percent of the Mexi-
can population, a growing figure, but one which still fell far short of that
achieved by Chile, Argentina, and other Latin American countries that
enacted comprehensive social security systems before Mexico. 4'
In addition to the problem of inadequate coverage, in the 1980s the
Mexican social security system also faced the problems of high cost to
the government and an inability to promote savings and investment. The
133. See id at 208-12.
134. See id. at 212. The 1917 Constitution, which is still in effect, was the first in Latin
America to recognize workers' rights, and it included provisions for equal wages for
equal work, a maximum workweek, and prohibitions on child labor. See id.
135. See id at 212-15, 220.
136. See id at 215.
137. See id. at 215-16.
138. See id
139. See id at 217-19. Rural workers received pensions in 1954, but IMSS covered
only seven percent of Mexico's total population in 1958, and twenty-five percent of the
population in 1970. See id In 1971, IMSS did not cover seventy-eight percent of Mex-
ico's municipalities. See Mesa-Lago, supra note 50, at 150-51.
140. Id. at 146 (quoting IMSS, Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social 1943-1983: 40
Atfos de Historia 47-49 (1983)).
141. See Mesa-Lago, supra note 105, at 364-65.
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administrative costs of social security in Mexico are among the highest in
Latin America.142 Considering the fact that employee contributions to
social security in Mexico are well below those figures for other countries,
it is apparent that the IMSS is a fiscal drain on the government.143
Although Mexico's population is still relatively young, it has expanded
rapidly since 1960,1' suggesting that when Mexico's baby boomers retire
the IMSS will be unable to pay for their pensions.
The state-run social security also failed to promote saving and invest-
ment in Mexico. This was largely a result of the failure of the system to
offer any incentives for individuals to save. Not only did real wages fall
drastically during the 1980s, providing workers with less income avail-
able for private saving,' 45 but high inflation during the same period 146
meant that workers who did choose to put money away were not offered
a positive return on their investment.' 47
b. Reform Through Privatization
To combat the problems of providing financial security in retirement
for Mexico's workers and promoting long-term savings, 148 on February
8, 1992 the Mexican Chamber of Deputies approved a law enacted by
decree by President Carlos Salinas de Gotari. This legislation's intent
was to reform the state-run social security system and establish a supple-
mental private pension system, called the Sistema de Ahorro para el Re-
tiro, or SAR.14 9 Influenced by Chile's privatization and the creation of
the AFPs, the SAR offers workers a supplement rather than an alterna-
tive to social security pensions.' 50 Just as before the enactment of the
reform, workers pay 7.4% of their salaries in taxes to the IMSS, which
uses the money to finance government pensions for current retirees.' 5 ,
Prior to the reform, a separate 5% tax on wages was paid to a govern-
ment housing fund. Under the new legislation, that money now is depos-
ited by the employers in the Bank of Mexico, the country's central
bank.'52 The government guarantees workers a post-inflation annual
rate of return of at least two percent on these deposits, thereby creating
142. See Mesa-Lago, supra note 50, at 165.
143. See Stanley Holt, Private Pension Plans: Whose Security?, Bus. Mex., June 1991
(In 1989, Mexican workers contributed seven percent of their salaries to social security,
compared to 11.2 percent in the United States and 13.2 percent in Chile.).
144. The Mexican population grew from 34.9 million in 1960 to eighty-two million in
1992. See Carstens, supra note 128.
145. See Holt, supra note 143.
146. Inflation in Mexico reached 159% in 1987 and dropped to about twenty percent
in 1991. See id.
147. See Carstens, supra note 128.
148. See Holt, supra note 143.
149. See Chamber of Deputies Approves Modifications to the Social Security System, Ins.
Res. Letter, June 7, 1992, available in Westlaw, INT-NEWS database.
150. See Holt, supra note 143.




an incentive for private saving.153
The most dramatic aspect of the new law is an additional tax of two
percent on workers' salaries, paid by employers and deposited in Mex-
ico's commercial banks, 154 which were privatized in 1991 and 1992.1"
The banks are required to invest these funds in government bonds, which
are guaranteed to pay a two percent real rate of return. 56 A second
stage of the reform, which was scheduled to begin in January, 1993, but
has been delayed,157 grants employees the option to transfer the funds of
these supplemental accounts from the private commercial banks to other
private investment fund managers and insurance companies.'""
Although these investment managers are not required to guarantee any
minimum return, they likely will offer higher yields than banks because
they will be permitted to invest in private sector stocks and bonds.'59
c. Evaluation of Privatization
Clearly, the SARs do not represent a full scale privatization of Mexi-
can social security to the extent that the AFPs do in Chile. Only two
percent of wages out of a total pension cotribution of 14.4% are man-
aged privately,"6 and this is the only portion of retirement contributions
over which Mexican employees exercise any control.
The incremental approach to social security reform in Mexico results
from the relative stability of the Mexican government and economy. Un-
like in Chile, where privatization was a response to fiscal crisis, Mexico
reformed its social security toward the end of a successful industrial
privatization program, which had already set the economy moving in the
right direction. President Salinas therefore could afford to institute a
more moderate reform, intended to complement a progress already in
effect. 161
Mexico's new, partially-privatized social security system should reach
153. See id.
154. See id. This tax is paid by employers essentially through a mandatory two per-
cent raise in wages, because initially employees could not afford the added tax burden.
Eventually the burden of funding this supplemental account will shift to employees. See
id
155. See Scott Schulz, Miles to Go, Latin Fin., July-Aug. 1993, at 35, 35.
156. See Carstens, supra note 128.
157. See Mexico: Calm After the Storm, Euromoney Supplements, Jan. 20, 1993, at 18.
158. See Carstens, supra note 128.
159. See id.
160. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
161. See Hansell, supra note 75, at 83. Of course, the fact that Mexico's democracy
consists of only a single party further facilitated reform, as Salinas was able to enact his
legislation by decree, avoiding the type of political struggle that Menem faced in Argen-
tina. See id.; supra notes 118-24 and accompanying text. There were some complaints
from different political pressure groups in Mexico. Labor representatives opposed work-
ers' lack of control over the bulk of their savings. See Holt, supra note 143. Some em-
ployers contended that their additional tax burden of two percent was unfair. See
Carstens, supra note 128. And current retirees complained that their pensions were not
increased by the reform. See id. at 13-14. None of these groups was powerful enough,
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its twin goals of furnishing secure retirements for Mexico's workers and
boosting Mexico's low rate of savings. 162 The SARs provide a substan-
tial source of retirement income for workers at no additional cost. Fur-
thermore, the restructuring of the state-run social security system
guarantees a positive rate of return on workers' savings and represents
the government's solid commitment to the Mexican workers. Finally,
workers have additional security through the "alternative ... of main-
taining his [SAR] investment in a safe asset."1 63
The new pension system also should promote savings and accelerate
the development of Mexico's capital markets, though not as rapidly as in
Chile, due to the "relatively small size of the contributions."'" Never-
theless, some observers project that the assets of the supplemental SAR
accounts will reach $10.5 billion by the year 2000, providing vast invest-
ment resources for Mexico's privatized banks. 65
Chile, Argentina, and Mexico are the three most prominent examples
of social security privatization in Latin America, but they are not the
only countries to issue such reforms. In fact, social security privatization
has been adopted or is being considered by most of the countries in the
region. 166
III. CAN PRIVATIZATIoN BE A FEASIBLE ALTERNATIVE FOR
SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES?
The case studies of social security reform in Chile, Argentina, and
Mexico demonstrate the benefits of replacing or supplementing a state-
run, "pay-as-you-go," social security system with a private pension pro-
gram. These reforms provide workers with greater insurance that their
retirements will be funded, because each worker's pension is a direct re-
sult of the contributions he or she makes during the working years. By
increasing the incentive to save, the national rate of savings rises, provid-
ing a substantial source of funds for private pension managers to invest in
however, nor were their complaints forceful enough to prevent Salinas from issuing his
decree. See Holt, supra note 143.
162. See id.
163. Hansell, supra note 75, at 83 (quoting Agustin Carstens).
164. Id. at 84. The magnitude of the effect will increase dramatically if, as some pre-
dictions indicate, the government increases the contribution rate to the SARs. See id.
165. See id.; Carstens, supra note 128.
166. See, e.g., William R. Long, Pensions in Chile Pay Off Handsomely, L.A. Times,
Sept. 28, 1993, World Report, at 4 (discussing privatization in Chile as a model followed
throughout Latin America). Peru adopted a system similar to that in Argentina, that
went into effect on June 21, 1993, and over fifty thousand workers opted to place their
retirement money in the private funds during their first three weeks of operation. See
Over 53,000 Peruvians Join Private Pension Fund, Reuters, July 13, 1993, available in
Westlaw, INT-NEWS database. For examples of proposed reforms in other Latin Amer-
ican countries, see, e.g., Brazil: Pension Market Overview-A Growth Industry, Global
Money Mgmt., Feb. 22, 1993, at 13, available in Westlaw, INT-NEWS database; Colom-




private capital markets. This increased investment spurred substantial
economic growth in Chile during the past decade, and is expected to
produce similar effects in Argentina and Mexico. The Latin American
models, however, do not show conclusively whether privatization can
work as a plan for social security reform in an industrial nation with a
mature economy such as the United States. In the United Kingdom, it
has.
A. "Contracting Out" of Social Security in the United Kingdom and
the Personal Pension Scheme
The first national old-age pension legislation in the United Kingdom
was the Old Age Pension Act of 1908.167 In its operation, however, this
law was not much different from a welfare program; pensions were not
supported by tax revenues, and strict means testing ensured that only
low-income individuals would receive assistance. 68 The 1908 Act was
replaced by new pension legislation in 1925, that, for the first time,
funded retirees pensions out of taxes received from employees and em-
ployers. Although there were no restrictions on who was required to pay
the tax, means testing continued to restrict the distribution of
pensions.1 69
Sir William Beveridge first proposed the concept of a universal retire-
ment pension program in the United Kingdom during the 1940s."'7 In
1942, Beveridge published a report entitled Social Insurance and Allied
Services, commonly called the Beveridge Plan. 7 ' In it, Beveridge advo-
cated a comprehensive and universal system of social insurance to reach
the goal of guaranteeing every citizen a basic minimum retirement in-
come without the use of a means test. 72 Based on these principles, Par-
liament enacted the National Assistance Act of 1948, providing a basic
flat rate pension based on a flat rate tax for all men over the age of sixty-
five and all women over the age of sixty.173
In 1959, Parliament passed further legislation that added an earnings-
related component to the basic pension coverage of the National Assist-
ance Act.'7 4 The most noteworthy aspect of the 1959 law was that work-
ers could opt out of the earnings-related "second tier" of pension
coverage if they already were covered by a private pension plan that of-
fered benefits that were equal to or greater than the government alterna-
167. See John C. Goodman, Social Security in the United Kingdom: Contracting Out
of the System 6-7, (1981). This legislation replaced private insurance institutions called
"friendly societies," which provided care for retirees in exchange for payments during
their working years. See id
168. See Williamson & Pampel, supra note 9, at 50-51.
169. See id. at 51-52.
170. See Goodman, supra note 167, at 10.
171. See id at 9-11.
172. See id
173. See id.
174. See id at 11.
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tive.'75 Individual workers, however, could not opt out on their own;
this alternative was offered collectively to all workers covered by each
private pension plan.1" 6
The Social Security Pensions Act of 1975 increased further the private
component of social security in the United Kingdom. 7 7 Beginning in
April, 1978, employers could elect to "contract out" of social security.' 78
Rather than pay full taxes to the government, an employer could choose
to have both it and its employees make contributions to approved private
pension fund managers. 179 By requiring the private pension managers to
guarantee a minimum benefit equal to the government's benefit and have
this guarantee indexed for inflation, this legislation also provided added
security. 8 ° In the first five years following the implementation of the
1975 Act, forty-five percent of employers in the United Kingdom opted
to contract out of social security."' The biggest problem was that the
choice to contract out still belonged to the employer, not the employ-
ees."82 All employees of a company were treated the same, regardless of
their age, income level, or pension needs. 183
While the contracting-out system under the 1975 legislation did reduce
considerably the burden of social security on the British government, 
8 4
further privatization was not far behind. With the Social Security Act of
1986, the bulk of the responsibility for pension shifted from the govern-
ment to individual workers."8 5 The 1986 Act reduced the benefits pro-
vided under the State Earnings Related Pension Scheme, or SERPS, to
induce workers to switch their pensions away from the government.'8 6
In addition, workers now may elect not to participate in an employer's
pension program, and contribute instead to an approved Personal Pen-
sion Scheme, or PPS, of the worker's own choosing. 8 7 In addition, as an
incentive for workers to withdraw from SERFS, the PPS initially pro-
vided an added financial benefit.'
Through this legislation, the government of the United Kingdom effec-
tively has privatized a substantial portion of its social security system. In
175. See id. at 11-14.
176. See id.
177. See Social Security Pensions Act, 1975, ch. 60 (Eng.).
178. See id. § 32.
179. See Goodman, supra note 167, at 43.
180. See Social Security Pensions Act, 1975, ch. 60, § 35 (Eng.).
181. See John C. Goodman, Private Alternatives to Social Security: The Experience of




184. See Goodman, supra note 181, at 107.
185. See Social Security Act, 1986, ch. 50 (Eng.).
186. See id. §§ 1-5.
187. See id.
188. See Joanne Wojcik, A Global Shift Toward Private Pension Plans, Bus. Ins., Oct.
4, 1993, at 37. The government also is considering eliminating its Guaranteed Minimum
Pension, to reduce further its fiscal burden. See id.
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doing so, it initiated long-term reform, which will ensure the future via-
bility of old-age security and enable the government to reduce its budget-
ary expenditures.
The case of the United Kingdom is only one example of a worldwide
trend toward privatized pension systems.18 9 In addition to the Latin
American countries that now employ some private alternative to social
security, various countries in Asia, Europe, and Australia rely on private
alternatives to supplement or replace state-run social security.' The
United States would be wise to privatize social security pensions at least
partially in order to prevent the future collapse of the old-age safety net.
B. Some Degree of Privatization Would Benefit the Social Security
System in the United States
Despite great disparity in the level of economic development, the
United States confronts similar problems as Latin American countries in
evaluating Social Security. Primary among these concerns is the need to
insure the retirements of today's working generation and stimulate the
national savings rate, which would lead to increased investment and eco-
nomic growth.
The Latin American case studies demonstrate how privatization of
pension systems can be implemented to resolve the long-term deficiencies
of a state-run social security system. In Chile, where the new pension
system has been in place for over a decade, privatization has reduced the
fiscal burden of social security on the government by shifting the finan-
cial responsibility for retirement to the individual.'' The reform has
benefitted individual workers in Chile as well as the economy as a whole.
Individuals receive a more secure and lucrative pension on their retire-
ment. The economy benefits because the balances of the private pension
accounts are invested in Chile's capital markets, increasing national sav-
ings and stimulating the economy through investment. In Argentina and
Mexico, similar systems are now in place, with similar visions of success
for the future. In these countries, the reform-minded governments hope
that the privatization of a portion of their social security systems will
provide both a secure future for their workers and stimulate economic
development.
Private pensions previously have been introduced unsuccessfully in
Congress. In 1991, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan proposed a reduc-
tion in the Social Security payroll tax, which would allow individuals to
exercise more control over their retirement money. 192 The attorney and
economist Peter J. Ferrara further has embraced the idea of private pen-
189. See id
190. See Peter J. Ferrara, Marching Toward Freedom, Nat'l Rev., July 9, 1990, at 38
(pointing to a 1988 study that reported that twenty-nine countries have privatized at least
a portion of their social security retirement benefit system).
191. See supra notes 81-90 and accompanying text.
192. See Ferrara, supra note 190, at 38.
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sions. Ferrara suggests a system similar to that of Chile, where employ-
ees would each maintain their own "Super IRA," a mandatory private
savings account.193 Critics of Ferrara's proposals cite the cost to today's
workers of financing both the pensions of current retirees through Social
Security and their own retirements through a Super IRA.
Though politically difficult to implement, the privatization of retire-
ment savings in the United States could be a great success. Such sweep-
ing reform could be achieved only slowly, not like in Chile under
Pinochet in 1980. The United States gradually should bring about a
transfer of retirement funds to private accounts, more akin to the reforms
in Argentina or Mexico, while keeping Social Security in place to guaran-
tee a minimum pension only for the most needy retirees.
CONCLUSION
A gradual implementation of privatization of Social Security in the
United States would increase national saving and investment, thereby
promoting economic growth. By shifting the burden of pensions away
from the federal government, the government could reduce its budget
deficits and, in the long-term, avert a crisis when there are too many
retirees to be supported using current Social Security tax withholdings.
Also, privatization would mandate lower income workers to save and
invest. This could make financial capital markets more accessible to low
wage earners than has been customary, opening the possibility for some
degree of reallocation of what is currently an unequal distribution of
wealth in the United States.
193. See Peter J. Ferrara, Social Security and the Super IRA: A Populist Proposal, in
Social Security: Prospects for Real Reform (Peter J. Ferrara ed., 1985), at 193, 194-97.
194. See Michael J. Boskin, Too Many Promises: The Uncertain Future of Social Se-
curity 100-04 (1986).
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